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Abstract: Empirical evidence on the growth benefits of capital inflows is mixed. The
growth benefits accruing from capital inflows also appear to be larger for high savings
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growth effects of capital inflows. The amount an economy can borrow is restricted
by an endogenous enforcement constraint. In our setting, with physical capital and a
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some policy implications.
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1 Introduction
The effect of capital inflows on growth during the period of financial globalization in
the world economy has attracted a lot of interest in recent years. This interest has
been reinforced by the decline and lack of recovery in cross-border capital flows for
rich and middle income countries after the Global Financial Crisis.1 Whether these
trends will have long-run consequences for growth is an open question. Textbook
economic theory would predict that capital inflows should be conducive to growth
as capital moves towards economies with better investment opportunities and is a
source of technological spillovers. However, empirical evidence has failed to find a
robust association between these variables. A substantial body of empirical evidence
has emerged in recent years2 showing that the growth impact of capital flows appears
elusive. The impact depends on variables such as the level of economic development,
financial depth, institutional quality, and the nature of capital flows. Also, most gains
are associated to TFP growth rather than capital accumulation. The external asset
position of countries also appears to matter. A puzzling observation commonly found
in the literature is that there is a positive correlation between net capital outflows
and growth (see Prasad et al, 2007). Countries running current account surpluses
and with higher savings rates grew faster than capital importing countries, leading
to the so-called “capital allocation puzzle”.3
We present a model that attempts to explain this evidence by focusing on the role
played by international credit constraints within an overlapping generations (OLG)
endogenous growth setting. The model is able to generate either positive or negative
growth effects of capital inflows as well as a role for domestic savings for the success
of liberalization policies. Contrary to the emphasis in much of the previous literature,
our focus here is on countries whose autarky interest rate is above the world interest
rate such that, when opening up, they would run current account deficits. In this
sense, our approach departs from the literature on the Lucas paradox, but comple-
ments it by analyzing the growth effects of capital inflows in deficit economies. The
endogenous growth setting also allows us to discuss long-run growth rather than sim-
ply transitional dynamics. The model departs from the small open economy (SOE)
setting assuming that foreign investment is restricted to be a percentage of the cap-
ital stock of the economy.4 This restriction is exogenous, and we use changes in it
to model capital account liberalizations. However, the amount agents can borrow in
1See McKinsey Global Institute (2013).
2See, among others, Aizenman and Sushko (2011), Beckaert et al (2005, 2011), Kose et al (2011),
Kose et al (2009), Obstfeld (2009), and Prasad et al (2007).
3See Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013).
4Foreign investment in our model is a claim on the physical capital stock of the country, which
includes FDI and equity inflows.
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international credit markets is endogenously determined.5 In this framework, agents
cannot commit with collateral and there are enforcement constraints that determine
how much agents can borrow on credit markets. Our endogenous growth setting has
a reproducible factor that generates externalities and leads to permanent growth in
steady state.6 For simplicity, we will call this factor “human-capital”. We also intro-
duce physical capital accumulation and a pay-as-you-go pension system. This allows
us to have determinacy and a unique steady state which can either be constrained or
unconstrained and the impact of capital flows on growth depends on the nature of
the steady state.
Our model is better thought of as representing the case of an emerging market with
high domestic marginal product of capital and with a history of past debt commitment
problems potentially preventing it from borrowing optimally. The effect of opening up
to capital inflows will depend on the steady state, which is a function of the savings
rate, human capital externalities, and the pensions system among other variables.
The intuition behind this result is that a rise in foreign investment inflows tends to
increase physical capital and thus lower its marginal product. Since we focus on the
case where the domestic interest rate exceeds the world interest rate, agents borrow
in international credit markets to finance investment in human capital. When they
enter the economy, agents choose their level of education financed by a credit. Since
they cannot commit, they can choose to either reimburse or not this loan when they
are middle-aged. If they reimburse, they can benefit from access to asset markets and
save between their middle-age and old-age. If they default, they cannot participate
in asset markets, and only consume the pension when they are old. This is because,
otherwise, their assets would be seized by international financial markets. The higher
the domestic interest rate, the more incentive agents have to refund their loan since
the return on savings is higher. We thus obtain that the impact of capital inflows on
growth depends on the nature of the steady state. In both steady states it leads to a
rise in physical capital, a decrease in the domestic interest rate and a rise in domestic
wages. In a constrained economy, however, domestic interest rates are too low and
agents have no incentives to refund their loans. As a result, the amount they can
borrow will be endogenously constrained and they under-invest in education. As a
consequence, growth falls. In an unconstrained economy, on the other hand, domestic
interest rates are high enough to encourage agents to refund their loans and they can
reach the optimal level of education. Capital inflows then increase growth because
they lead to a reduction of domestic interest rates - which still remain high enough
- and an increase in wages. The return on human capital is higher and so is the
optimal level of education and economic growth. Any factor whose increase is able
5See Azariadis and Lambertini (2003) and Kehoe and Levine (1993).
6See De La Croix and Michel (2007).
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to generate a rise in domestic interest rates, such as the rate of time preference, is
likely to drive the economy from the constrained to the unconstrained steady state.
We thus find that, as in Aghion et al (2009), domestic savings matter for growth.
This setting also allows us to present a quantitative exercise. We first assess
the likelihood of economies converging to the constrained steady state given a set of
calibrated parameters obtained from data. We then look at what would the required
savings rate or public pension outlays be for these economies to converge to the
unconstrained steady state. We finally assess the growth effects of increased capital
inflows in the model. We carry out this exercise using parameter calibration values
for Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Greece, Italy and Spain. We find that, for the
majority of these economies, there is a high likelihood of converging to the constrained
steady state, especially if human capital externalities are high. For a large number of
countries, we also find that the savings rate and the public pension outlays required
to converge to the unconstrained steady state is much larger (much lower in the case
of pension contributions) than the one observed in data. We also find that the growth
effects of capital flows are quantitatively very small.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief discussion
of evidence and the literature. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 analyzes the
equilibrium in a no-commitment setting. Section 5 discusses equilibrium dynamics.
Section 6 focuses on the relationship between capital flows and economic growth.
Section 7 presents a quantitative exercise, and section 8 concludes.
2 Literature and evidence: discussion
Much of the related theoretical literature has focused on the effect of growth on capital
flows in a context where liberalizing countries display low autarky interest rates and,
as a consequence, export capital as they grow. Prasad et al (2007) and Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2013) show that the correlation between per capita GDP growth and
the average current account (CA) to GDP ratio is positive and significant. The
“capital allocation puzzle” is then that countries that grow fast and invest more tend
to be net exporters of capital. Related to this paradox is the phenomenon of Global
Imbalances (GIs) and the shift in the sources of world savings from developed to
emerging countries since the late 1990s. Special focus has been placed on the role
played by China and differential levels of financial sector development to explain these
phenomena. Although our paper deals with the opposite situation where countries’
autarky interest rate exceeds the world interest rate, it is worth understanding some
of the mechanisms relating growth and capital flows in this literature to contextualize
our analysis.
The literature on GIs has studied the phenomenon as a consequence of equilibrium
3
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capital flows placing emphasis on either the supply or demand of assets that allow
for risk diversification. Caballero et al (2008), for instance, identify the differential
supply of safe assets as the main driving force behind capital flowing from emerging to
developed countries. As developed countries offer less volatile and safer returns, savers
tilt their portfolios towards countries with deeper financial sectors. An analogous
argument is used in Mendoza et al (2009), who focus on the role of limited contract
enforcement in emerging countries’ financial markets. A large body of literature has
since developed to explain the coincidence between the Chinese growth acceleration
and GIs.7 Several of these papers share in common the existence of a precautionary
savings motive and incomplete markets. Because of the impossibility of insuring
against idiosyncratic income risk with incomplete markets, a precautionary savings
motive arises. This increases the supply of savings and drives a wedge between the
marginal product of capital and the interest rate. When these countries liberalize
their capital accounts to countries with more risk diversification opportunities and
TFP increases, they become net exporters of capital. The focus is mostly on the
relationship running from TFP growth to the generation of excess savings and hence
CA surpluses. These models are adequate to explain GIs and the experience of
countries such as China. However, as Henry (2007) shows, in most cases, capital
account liberalizations entail a decrease in the cost of capital implying that they
would lead to net capital inflows.
As in our model, Aoki et al (2010) introduce credit constraints using a Kiyotaki-
Moore type8 setting with domestic and international borrowing constraints. They
show that, when the domestic financial system is underdeveloped, capital account
liberalization is not necessarily beneficial for growth because it can lead to TFP
stagnation in the long-run or short-run employment losses. Their setting, however,
does not consider endogenous growth. The models presented in Aghion et al (2009)
and Song et al (2011) also share common features with ours in that domestic savings
matter for growth. In Aghion et al (2009) growth is driven by countries acquiring
best practice technologies from abroad by attracting FDI. Savings matter because
foreign investors require knowledge from local entrepreneurs. Local entrepreneurs,
in turn, require savings to put equity in the partnership with foreign investors. In
this model, as emphasized by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013), the causality runs from
savings to growth. In Song et al (2011) they explain Chinese growth and high savings
rates in terms of the dual structure of Chinese firms with state owned and private
firms. Private firms are the source of growth but are credit constrained and hence
require savings to expand. These savings arise from the inequality that develops
7See, for instance, Angeletos and Panousi (2011), Broner and Ventura (2010), Buera and Shin
(2009), Carroll and Jeanne (2009), Coeurdacier et al (2013), Sandri (2010) and Song et al (2011)
amongst many others.
8See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
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between managers and workers as only managers benefit from growth. This explains
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Figure 1: Current account and growth rate difference between post- and
pre-liberalization. Deficit countries.
As already noted, most of the literature focuses on savings surplus countries. How-
ever, the positive association between the CA and growth also happens for deficit
countries. Figure 1 plots the difference between pre- and post-liberalization growth
performance against initial CA to GDP ratio for 24 deficit countries between 1975
and 2010.9 It shows that the growth success of capital account liberalization policies
is positively correlated with the CA. Thus, even for countries that are net foreign bor-
rowers, savings seem to matter for growth after opening up the capital account to cap-
ital inflows. Table 1 also shows the growth difference from pre- to post-liberalization
periods for three groups of CA deficit countries.10 The countries are grouped as high
or low savings according to whether domestic savings are above or below the average
9Countries are classified as deficit countries if the average CA position before the liberalization
episode is negative. Periods of capital account liberalization are identified using the Chinn and Ito
(2007) index combined with the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) dataset and a detailed analysis of
country policies. We define capital account liberalization as a change of the Chinn-Ito index from
negative to positive when this change is substantial (i.e. higher than the average change for the
country). We also check whether this is accompanied by a substantial (ex-post) increase in the ratio
of foreign assets plus liabilities as a percentage of GDP. Finally, we compared our periods with other
available sources about liberalization programmes.
10The groups of countries considered are as follows. OECD: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark,
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of their group. The growth difference in differences between high and low saving
countries is always positive.
Table 1: Change in GDP growth before and after capital account
liberalization (CA deficit countries)




Latin America High 0.821
Low 0.602
Difference High-Low 0.219
South East Asia High -0.143
Low -1.309
Difference High-Low 1.166
Our model thus focuses on deficit countries for which capital inflows may change
the incentives to repay back international private loans. This generates an endogenous
credit constraint that is determined by a “willingness to pay” motive rather than a
“capacity to borrow” motive as in models with exogenous collateral constraints (see
Arellano and Mendoza, 2002). The model features endogenous growth and achieves
determinacy by introducing capital and a pay-as-you-go pensions system. This allows
us to focus on the role of savings and public pension outlays as key determinants of
the steady state towards which the economy converges. The return on savings and the
pensions system determine income after working age and hence the incentive to repay
the credit acquired to build human capital. This, in turn, determines whether opening
up to foreign capital inflows will have beneficial or detrimental effects on growth.
Given these characteristics, our model is better suited to analyze the experience of
Latin American countries and several Southern European countries especially after
the sovereign debt turmoil since 2010.
Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK. Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. South East
Asia: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand.
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3 Model
We consider an overlapping generations model with accumulation of productivity
enhancing activities (human capital in a loose sense) and an endogenous credit con-
straint as in De La Croix and Michel (2007). In this framework, we introduce physical
capital accumulation and a pay-as-you-go pension system and assume that the econ-
omy has access to international credit markets at the exogenous world interest rate
factor RW .
3.1 Production
Consider a perfectly competitive economy in which final output is produced using
physical capital K and human capital H , and t denotes the time period. The produc-
tion function of a representative firm is F (Kt, Ht) ≡ Htf (kt) with k ≡ K/H. Capital
fully depreciates each period.
Assumption 1. f(k) is Cr over R+ for r large enough, increasing (f
′(k) > 0) and
concave (f ′′(k) < 0) over R++.
The domestic interest factor Rt and the wage rate wt then satisfy:
wt = f (kt)− ktf
′ (kt) , Rt = f
′ (kt) .
3.2 Households
Population growth rate is n. The typical household lives for 3 periods. An agent born
in t− 1 draws utility from consumption when middle-aged ct and old dt+1
V = u (ct, dt+1) (1)
Assumption 2. The utility function u(., .) is increasing in its arguments and con-
cave; it is homogeneous of degree one (homothetic preferences) and satisfies the Inada
conditions.
Individuals born in period t − 1 borrow an amount bt-1 of goods when young to
build up their human capital ht for the middle-aged period. When middle-aged, they
receive a wage wtht, with wt the wage per unit of efficient labor, and pay a proportional
tax τ ∈ (0, 1) to finance a balanced pension system. When old, they retire and receive
pt+1 = (1 + n)τwt+1ht+1 issued from a pay-as-you-go system. Following De La Croix
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with education productivity denoted by A > 0, and 0 < λ < 1 being the education
externality. Human capital depends on individual investment bt-1 and on the inherited
human capital of the previous generation ht-1. This latter effect may be viewed
as inter-generational transmission of human capital or as the externality effect of
society’s education level. In our preferred wider sense, 1−λ would reflect productivity
or knowledge spillovers from the previous generation’s stock of technological know-
how on the current generation’s stock. bt−1 is the investment effort of the current
generation on productivity enhancing activities.
Assumption 3. The domestic interest factor Rt is greater than the constant world
interest factor RW ∀t.
11
Under this assumption, as interest rates are lower in the international credit mar-
ket than in the domestic market, households will always prefer to save in the domestic
market and borrow in the international market. For simplicity, we assume that agents
cannot arbitrage by borrowing internationally and lending at home. This assumption
allows us to obtain simpler analytical solutions by ignoring arbitrage profits, but it
does not change the uniqueness properties of the steady state.12 This can be con-
ceptualized as representing a situation where a national investment bank borrows in
international markets on behalf of households for their human capital investment, but
households can only save at home and borrow from the national bank. This national
bank, in turn, has the ability to seize household savings in case of default as we will
see below. We further assume that there is no possibility of collateralizing human
capital.
Let us consider successively the agents’ choices under a commitment and a no-
commitment setting.
3.3 Optimal decisions in a commitment setting
In a commitment setting, agents born in t−1 refund their loan bt−1 at time t and their
potential middle-age loan st at time t + 1. The variable st denotes either borrowing
or saving. When st > 0, agents save at time t on the domestic market and get the
domestic return Rt+1. Thus, the period budget constraints are
ct = wtht(1− τ)− st −RW bt−1, (3)
dt+1 = pt+1 +Rt+1st,
where RW is the interest factor paid on international loans. Under Assumption 3, the
debt each young agent contracts to finance her education is a loan from foreigners.
11This assumption will be satisfied as long as domestic capital intensity in steady state is low
enough relative to world capital intensity and initially the domestic capital intensity is not too high.
12See Christopoulos et al (2013).
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We denote ω1 first period income and ω2 second period income:
ω1t = wtht(1− τ)−RW bt−1
ω2t+1 = pt+1
As the level of education determines the life cycle income, and the amount of sav-
ing determines the allocation of the consumption between middle age and retirement
in order to maximize welfare, the two optimal decisions can be computed indepen-
dently. We proceed into two steps. First, we determine optimal savings and, second,
considering the education level as given, we then compute the optimal education level.
max
st
u (ω1t − st, ω2t+1 +Rt+1st) .
The FOC is
−u′1 (ct, dt+1) +Rt+1u
′
2 (ct, dt+1) = 0,
which can be written in implicit form as:
dt+1
ct
= µ (Rt+1) . (4)
Then, optimal savings are given by
s∗t =
µ (Rt+1)ω1t − ω2t+1
Rt+1 + µ (Rt+1)
. (5)
To facilitate the algebra, we define xt, the debt repayment as a percentage of



















We can then rewrite ω1 and ω2 as
ω1t = (1− τ − xt)wtht, (7)
ω2t+1 = τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1. (8)
The pension system is a convenient assumption since then the third period income
does not depend on the agent’s human capital or her education choice. Thus the
optimal level of education only maximizes ω1. Agents born in period t− 1 choose the





wtht(1− τ)− RW bt−1.
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Using ht = Ae
λ









t−1 − RW et−1
)
.












e∗1−λt−1 = λ(1− τ). (10)
Note that the optimal repayment level only depends on pension contributions (τ) and
the education externality parameter (λ).
3.4 Optimal decisions in a no commitment setting
Since there is no collateral for loans, agents can choose to refund or default on cred-
its.13 In this no commitment setting, an endogenous constraint emerges. When
adults, agents can choose to either refund or default on their education loan. If they
repay, they are allowed to participate in asset markets next period and budget con-
straints are similar to equations (3). If they decide not to refund their credit, they are
excluded from asset markets forever. That is, if they attempted to return to capital
markets, their savings would be seized to pay the outstanding debt.14
This is the basic punishment mechanism. Nevertheless, we also analyze the case in
which, as well as this exclusion from capital markets, agents can be punished with a
proportional tax T on their pension income when old. Qualitatively (see Appendix A)
the key results of the model do not change. However, it is well known that models with
limited commitment may generate too little debt in equilibrium.15 In our context,
this translates into a high likelihood of a country falling in the constrained steady
state. For this reason, in the quantitative analysis in section 6, we introduce this
pensions tax as an additional punishment. In what follows, and for simplicity, we
describe the model abstracting from this tax.
13A pension system is considered in the model because a second period income is necessary to
consider endogenous debt constraints. If households do not receive a retirement income, they will
always pay back their loan to be able to save in middle age and thus to consume when retired.
14Note that here we do not assume only ‘reputational’ costs as in the early debt default literature
(Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981) but also the possibility of asset seizing hence impeding any sort of
smoothing through saving (Bulow and Rogoff, 1989).
15See Aguiar and Amador (2013) for an overview in the context of models of sovereign debt.
10
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Under no commitment, thus, agents cannot save and their budget constraints are
ct = wtht(1− τ) (11)
dt+1 = pt+1
The problem of the consumer born in t − 1 is to maximize its utility (1) subject to
the human capital accumulation technology (2), the budget constraints (3) and the
following individual rationality constraints (IRC):
1. IRC old-age: The middle-age agents are not allowed to borrow because they
would rationally never reimburse their debt when old. Hence savings should be
nonnegative:
st ≥ 0 (12)
2. IRC middle-age: The utility of repaying the debt and hence being able to save
should be larger than the utility obtained from consuming only labor income in
each period. This constraint can be written as:
max
st
u (ω1t − st, ω2t+1 +Rt+1st) ≥ u (wtht(1− τ), (1 + n)τwt+1ht+1) (13)
or combining (12) and (13) we obtain a unique IRC:
max
st≥0
u (ω1t − st, ω2t+1 +Rt+1st) ≥ u (wtht(1− τ), (1 + n)τwt+1ht+1)
with Rt observed and Rt+1 expected, kt is predetermined.
In this no-commitment setting, when the IRC old age holds, we know that agents
have incentive to save. Nevertheless, they may have no incentive to refund their
loans under IRC middle age, since the associated loss is higher than the gain from
saving.
Let V be the indirect utility with commitment:
V (ω1t, ω2t+1, Rt+1) = max
st
u (ω1t − st, ω2t+1 +Rt+1st) ,
and V + be the indirect utility considering IRC old age:
V + (ω1t, ω2t+1, Rt+1) = max
st≥0
u (ω1t − st, ω2t+1 +Rt+1st) .
We first look for the upper bound on borrowing which constrains education invest-
ment, taking temporarily Rt−1 and Rt as given. In this no-commitment setting,
investors will lend only when agents are willing to refund their loans. We define the
11
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bound x¯ as the one that equalizes utility when refunding and defaulting. We then
obtain the effective level of saving and borrowing (s˜ and x˜) comparing the optimal
and the constrained levels.





then s∗t ≤ 0 and
x˜t = s˜t = 0. Otherwise, s˜t = s
∗
t > 0 and x˜t =Min(x
∗
t , x¯t) with x¯t the solution of
(Rt+1(1− τ − x¯t)wtht + τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1)u
′
2 (ct, dt+1) =
u ((1− τ)wtht, τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1) (14)
Proof: Substituting equation (7) and (8) into equation (5), we get:
s∗t =
µ (Rt+1) (1− τ − xt)wtht − τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1
Rt+1 + µ (Rt+1)
(15)






, then s∗t ≤ 0, agents have no incentive to
save even when they do not borrow. As s∗t is decreasing with xt, we still have s
∗
t ≤ 0
when xt > 0. It follows that, under IRC old age, optimal savings are equal to zero






, the maximum level of






, then s∗t > 0. Hence,
there is a bound xmax > 0 such that, when xt ≥ xmax, then s
∗
t ≥ 0 and thus V
+ = V.
The IRC middle age gives a second upper bound x¯ < xmax above which the agent
will not refund, meaning that no loan will be granted. Under IRC old-age, IRC middle
age can be written as
V + (wtht (1− τ − xt) , τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1, Rt+1) ≥ (16)
u (wtht(1− τ), τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1) .
Using the homogeneity of the utility function, V (ω1, ω2, R) = (Rω1 + ω2) u
′
2, the IRC
constraint (16) can be rewritten as:
(Rt+1(1− τ − xt)wtht + τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1)u
′
2 (ct, dt+1) ≥
u (wtht(1− τ), τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1) .
We finally determine the borrowing limit x¯ as the solution of equation (14).
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The introduction of ∆t+1 will simplify the analytical solution of the model and allows
for graphical representations.
From equation (14), the level of the threshold x¯ depends on the pension tax pa-
rameter τ . Thus, we can analyze the impact of the government choice of τ (economic
policy) on households’ borrowing and investment in education.
Corollary 1. The utility of default u (wtht(1− τ), τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1) is increasing
with τ if and only if τ < 1 − ǫc where ǫc ≡ cu
′
1(c, d)/u(c, d). The indirect utility
V + (wtht (1− τ − xt) , τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1, Rt+1) is increasing with τ if and only if (1+
n)∆t+1 > 1.




1 (wtht(1− τ), τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1) < (1 + n)u
′
2 (wtht(1− τ), τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1) .
(18)
Using the homogeneity property of the utility function:
u (wtht(1− τ), τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1) = wtht(1− τ)u
′
1 (wtht(1− τ), τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1)
+τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1u
′
2 (wtht(1− τ), τ(1 + n)wt+1ht+1) .
Inequality (18) is equivalent to τ < 1−ǫc. Using the Euler equation (4), the derivative
of the indirect utility with respect to τ is:
dV +
dτ









Which carries the sign of dc∗/dτ = βwtht ((1 + n)∆t+1 − 1).
As the utility function is homogeneous of degree one, we can compute 1 − ǫc =
µ(R)/(R + µ(R)) which is the optimal saving rate. A change in τ will affect the
middle age rationality constraint (16) in two ways.
i. In case of default, agents cannot save. Their second period income is only
the pay-as-you-go pension. An increase in τ will decrease their middle age
consumption and increase their old age consumption. When τ is lower than the
optimal saving rate, a rise in τ makes intertemporal consumption choices closer
to what the optimal choices would be (in case of access to the saving market).
When τ is lower than this optimal saving rate, a rise in τ will increase the utility
of default, which is the right hand side of the middle age rationality constraint
(16). Thus, this rise in τ tightens the constraint.
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ii. In the case of refund, agents have access to financial markets. Thus there are
two ways of transferring income from the middle age to the old age period:
the pay-as-you-go pension system and saving. The condition (1 + n)∆t+1 > 1
can be rewritten (1 + n)wt+1ht+1/wtht > Rt+1, and thus means that the return
from the pension system is higher than the return from private savings. In
that case, when τ is raised, the utility of refund increases. The left hand side of
the middle age rationality constraint (16) is higher which relaxes the constraint.
Hence, we find four cases. When τ < 1 − ǫc and (1 + n)∆t+1 < 1, a rise in τ
will always tighten the constraint, which means that x¯ will decrease with τ . When
τ > 1−ǫc and (1+n)∆t+1 > 1, x¯ will always increase with τ . Whereas when τ < 1−ǫc
and (1 + n)∆t+1 > 1, or τ > 1 − ǫc (1 + n)∆t+1 > 1, the sign of the variation of x¯
with respect to τ is ambiguous.
We now consider simple specifications of the utility and production functions, to
derive explicitly the value of the bound x¯ that determines the maximum repayment
(and borrowing) allowed by international credit markets.
Assumption 4. Preferences are represented by the utility function u(ct, dt+1) =
cβt d
1−β
t+1 with 0 < β < 1. The production function is f(kt) = k
α
t with α ∈ (0, 1).
From equation (14), considering these simple functions, we can compute explicitly
x¯t ≡ x¯(∆t+1). We obtain the following corollary:
Corollary 2. Under assumption 4, the effective loan is
x˜t =Min (x
∗, x¯t) (20)











1−β − τ(1 + n)∆t+1. (21)
When x∗ > x¯t agents are constrained in their education investment choice, whereas
they are unconstrained when x∗ < x¯t. Given equation (6), we also obtain the con-
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3.5 Macroeconomic equilibrium
Under assumption 3, agents prefer to save at home and borrow in the international
market. We consider that foreign inflows of FDI and equity are policy-restricted. This
allows us to model the effect of a liberalization policy that allows for increased foreign
ownership in the economy’s capital stock. We thus have the following assumption:
Assumption 5. Foreigners cannot hold more than a proportion φ ∈ [0, 1) of the total
domestic capital stock.
Macroeconomic equilibrium consists of:
i. The labor market equilibrium:
Ht = Nt−1ht. (23)
ii. The asset market equilibrium:
Kt+1 = Nt−1st + φKt+1 ⇔ (1− φ)Kt+1 = Nt−1st. (24)
Under assumptions 3 and 5, the asset market equilibrium condition equalizes the
available capital stock in period t + 1 to the amount of domestic savings in period t
plus the amount of foreign capital invested in the country: Since Kt+1 = kt+1Ht+1,
then (1− φ)kt+1Ht+1 = Nt−1st. Dividing by Nt−1ht we obtain:




Under assumption 4, optimal savings from equation (5) become:
st
ht
= wt ((1− β)(1− τ − xt)− β(1 + n)τ∆t+1) . (26)
And we can rewrite the asset market equilibrium equation (25) as:
(1− φ)(1 + n)Aeλt kt+1 = wt ((1− β)(1− τ − xt)− β(1 + n)τ∆t+1) . (27)







the equilibrium equation is finally:
(1 + n)∆t+1((1− φ)
α
1− α
+ βτ) = (1− β)(1− τ − xt). (29)
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Figure 2: The Dark curve represents effective x (optimal under the IRC
constrainst). Case 1 (resp. Case 2) gives the equilibrium EˆB1 (resp. EˆB2) when
market clearing conditions are represented by curve xˆ1(∆) (resp. curve xˆ2(∆)).
If we denote by xˆ the equilibrium debt repayment, then:










An equilibrium is an intertemporal sequence (kt, xt)
+∞
t=0 which solves the firm’s
and the consumer’s programs, and such that markets clear. Thus, a perfect foresight
equilibrium is defined by ∆t+1 such that in period t the effective optimal choice
considering the constraint x˜, from equation (21), is equal to the equilibrium value xˆ,
from equation (30). Since from these equations x˜t and xˆt are functions of ∆t+1 for all
t ≥ 0 and intersect only once, then for a given economy, there exists a unique value of
∆t+1 = ∆ corresponding to the equilibrium. The equilibrium discounted wage growth
rate ∆ is characterized by a set of parameters, and is constant whatever the initial
condition k0 (see next section). Nevertheless, capital intensity kt will dynamically
adjust from this initial condition k0. Figure 2 depicts the equilibrium, which can
either be unconstrained (EˆB1) or constrained (EˆB2). For instance, the unconstrained
equilibrium would correspond to an economy B1 whose public pensions system size,
τ , is small whereas the constrained one would correspond to an economy B2 where
τ is high. A policy decreasing τ may change the equilibrium from constrained to
unconstrained. Likewise, other relevant parameter changes, including the degree of
openness φ and the savings rate (determined by β), can affect the equilibrium towards
16
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which the economy converges.16
4 Equilibrium dynamics
Proposition 2. For any initial condition k0 > 0, an economy where 0 < φ < 1
converges to a unique steady state equilibrium. But depending on parameter values,
two configurations can occur:






, the economy is unconstrained and the steady




























, the economy is constrained and the steady




















Proof: See Appendix B.
The analysis of the model’s dynamics implies that, whatever the initial condition
k0, the economy will converge monotonically to the long run steady state. This steady













. Moreover, if parameters change (a
rise in φ for example) such that the economy moves from one regime to the other,
the economy just jumps to the new equilibrium path converging monotonically to the
new steady state.
16In the case of a pension system depending on the agent’s own human capital, agents would have
an additional incentive to invest in education. This might increase the level of education and could
also potentially change the equilibrium from constrained to unconstrained.
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5 Capital inflows and economic growth
The model describes an economy which can either be constrained or unconstrained
depending on parameters such as the size of the public pension (τ), population growth
(n), time preference (β) and, finally, the degree of financial openness φ. We focus
here on the effect of capital flows on growth through parameter φ.
Proposition 3. Financial openness and equilibrium.
Under assumptions 3, 4, and 5, there is a unique value φ¯ such that the borrow-










β . The bound φ¯ is decreasing with the pension tax
τ .
Proof: See Appendix C.
Proposition 3 defines a threshold for financial openness φ¯ below (above) which an
economy is unconstrained (constrained) whatever the initial condition k0. Another
look at figure 2 illustrates the situation of country B. Initially, economy B is
unconstrained and the equilibrium is EˆB1. An increase in openness rotates the
equilibrium doted line anti-clockwise and the new equilibrium is EˆB2. In this new
equilibrium, economy B is constrained. The calibration section provides some
examples of countries which may behave as country B. Since when the pension tax
τ increases the incentive to repay the educational loan decreases, the bound φ¯ is
decreasing with τ .








Proposition 4. Financial openness and balanced growth path.
Under assumptions 3, 4 and 5, if φ ≤ φ¯ the economy is unconstrained, and if φ > φ¯
the economy is constrained. Let ε denote an increase in financial openness such that,
initially, financial openness is φ and becomes φ+ ε with liberalization.
i. When the economy is initially constrained (φ > φ¯), the growth rate is decreasing
with openness.
ii. When the economy is initially unconstrained (φ < φ¯) and remains unconstrained
(φ+ ε < φ¯), the growth rate is increasing with openness.
iii. When the economy is initially unconstrained (φ < φ¯) and becomes constrained
with openness (φ+ε > φ¯), the growth rate is first increasing and then decreasing
with openness, with a maximum at φ¯.
18
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Figure 3: Openness and growth: the figure graphs growth g against openness φ,
where φ¯ and φ¯ are the two thresholds defined in the main text. It illustrates two
configurations, a constrained economy (g¯ < g∗) and an unconstrained economy
when φ < φ¯ (g∗ < g¯).
The intuition behind this proposition 4 is as follows. An increase in openness
mechanically rises the stock of capital and thus increases the wage and decreases
the domestic interest rate. The way these changes affect the economy depends
on the steady state. In Figure 3, the left panel corresponds to the case where an
initially constrained economy remains constrained whatever φ ∈ (0, 1). The interest
rate drop reduces agents’ incentives to save and to refund their loan when adult
(interest rate effect). Agents become endogenously more constrained and, hence,
education spending decreases. This means that, for an initially constrained economy,
openness is bad for growth.The second right panel corresponds to the case where
an initially unconstrained economy may become constrained with openness: φ < φ¯
but φ + ε > φ¯. As long as φ ≤ φ¯, the economy remains unconstrained and then the
rise in w increases the incentive to invest in human capital (wage effect). Agents
are unconstrained and can reach this higher level of education. This means that, in
an initially unconstrained economy, a moderate increase in capital inflows is good
for growth. Conversely, if φ + ε > φ¯, the interest rate effect dominates and the
growth rate starts decreasing with openness. Nevertheless, the growth rate of the
open economy still exceeds the almost closed economy one as long as φ + ε < φ¯
with φ¯ such that, if we denote constrained and unconstrained growth respectively as







Above this threshold φ¯, openness has a global negative effect on growth.
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To summarize, in the model, financial openness is bad for growth if the economy is
initially constrained, or if openness becomes too large ( φ+ε > φ¯). This is because, for
given values of τ , β, λ, and n, the larger the capital inflows, the stronger is the interest
rate effect and hence the incentive to default which constrains access to international
credit markets. The question is then, what the role of savings and policy variables is
in determining the success of liberalization policies. We address this question with a
quantitative exercise.
6 Quantitative analysis
We present a quantitative exercise in order to assess how likely the constrained steady
state is to happen for a series of selected countries. We also address a policy question:
what would be the savings rate and/or public pension contributions required to move
the economy from the constrained to the unconstrained steady state? Finally, we
address quantitatively the growth gains of capital flows under both equilibria. We
calibrate the model using data on seven countries. These have been selected in terms
of their relevance to the theory model. They include Latin American countries as
well as Southern European countries. The selection is, however, limited due to data
availability.
The parameters of the model are calibrated using data from different sources.
Table 2 collects parameter values. We consider a generation to last 25 years. Pop-
ulation growth n is the rate of growth of working age population obtained from the
World Development Indicators (WDI). To measure τ , we use pension outlays as a
percentage of GDP from OECD statistics and OECD Pensions at a Glance (2009)
and divide it through by one minus the capital share to obtain τ as pension outlays
as a percentage of wage income. Capital shares, α, are given in Caselli (2005), except
for Brazil which is given by Gomes et al. (2005). Parameter φ is the stock of FDI
and equity investment as a percentage of GDP (average for 1970-2007) from Lane
and Milesi-Ferreti (2007). This is then transformed into a percentage of capital stock
using the capital-labor ratio from Caselli (2005). We calculate the marginal product
of capital R as αY/K, where Y/K is obtained as the average output to capital ratio
for the 1950-2011 period from the Penn World Tables (PWT). To calibrate the rate
of time preference, namely β, we consider data on private savings rates (from WDI,
Eurostat and OECD), the marginal product of capital (R), working age population





(1− β)− βτ (1 + n)
wt+1ht+1
Rt+1
Along the steady path, we have kt+1 = kt = k, then wt+1 = wt = w and the saving
20









Given R, g, τ and n we compute β from equation (35).17 Finally, education produc-
tivity A is calibrated so as to match the rate of growth of per capita GDP for these
economies in the pre-liberalization period. For most countries, where available, and
where not indicated otherwise, we used data from 1970 to 2010.
Table 2: Parameters calibration. Annualized rates.
n τ α φ R β
Brazil 0.047 0.1066 0.25 0.075 0.070335 0.6855
Chile 0.035 0.0476 0.16 0.25 0.072643 0.6967
Colombia 0.055 0.0568 0.12 0.017 0.038423 0.6939
Greece 0.008 0.1188 0.15 0.04 0.05132 0.7427
Italy 0.004 0.1341 0.21 0.045 0.063015 0.6770
Mexico 0.054 0.0093 0.25 0.077 0.108584 0.6908
Spain 0.012 0.1013 0.24 0.08 0.088658 0.7040
Parameter λ represents the contribution of private education spending to human
capital accumulation. This elasticity is crucial to determine whether a country con-
verges to the constrained or the unconstrained steady state since it determines the
private returns to investment in human capital. However, there is no direct observ-
able measure for this parameter. Accordingly, we use a range of values for λ for all
countries proxied from cross-country estimates. In order to obtain plausible values
for λ, we estimate (1 − λ) as the degree of inter-generational education persistence
for a cross-section of close to 150 countries. This is, no doubt, an imperfect measure.
But we take these only as reference for a range of calibrated values. Based on the
human capital accumulation equation (2), we estimate:
ln hi,t = lnA + (1− λ) lnhi,t−25 +X
′
i,tχ+ εi,t. (36)
Here, hi,t is the average number of years of education of population aged 15 years
or more for country i at time t, where we use three different reference periods
t = 2000, 2005, 2010. Variable hi,t−25 is the average number of years of education
a generation earlier, i.e. 25 years earlier, such that t − 25 = 1975, 1980, 1985. X ′ is
a vector of control variables to proxy for investment in education, and χ is a vector
of parameters to estimate. The control variables include public and private (where
17Note that we observe the savings rate from the data. For calibration, we transform these as
savings as a percentage of wage income dividing them by the labor share (1− α).
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available) spending in education, pupil to teacher ratios, PCs per 100 people, and
internet users per 100 people as proxies for education effort. All data come from the
World Bank Education Statistics. In some specifications, we also measured hi,t the
average number of years of education of population aged 25 years or more. We ex-
perimented with a large number of specifications using different dependent variables
and combinations of control variables that differed greatly in terms of the sample of
countries considered.18 The great majority of the estimates of λ fell in the range of
0.3 to 0.6. Given these estimates, we carry out the calibration below using values for
λ = 0.35, 0.45, 0.55.19
Using Proposition 2, we can compute the threshold φ¯. To determine whether a
country is constrained or not in the long run we compare this threshold with the
observed φ. As discussed in Section 3 and Appendix A, the punishment based on
exclusion from capital markets is usually too small to generate enough incentives
to refund the educational loan. We thus introduce a proportional tax on pensions
income under no commitment. This tax increases incentives to reimburse the loan by
reducing expected pensions income in case of default. We used alternative values for
this proportional tax. The results presented below are for a tax of 30% (i.e. T = 0.3).
For each country, Table 3 collects the different values of φ¯ (for the three values of
λ) and the last column gives the observed value of φ. Comparing φ and φ¯, we can
sort the countries in three groups. Colombia, Greece, and Italy belong to the group
of countries that are always constrained even with the low boundary for λ. Mexico
is the only country that is always unconstrained regardless of λ. The other countries
may be in a constrained or unconstrained equilibrium depending on λ. Table 3 also
reports φ¯ for which increased capital inflows would have a globally negative growth
effect.20 None of the countries exceed this threshold.
Given the importance of the savings rate and the policy parameter τ , we can
calculate what would be the implied savings rate and/or pension contribution that
would ensure convergence to an unconstrained steady state. Keeping all parameters
fixed, we determine successively the threshold in β (or, alternatively, the saving rate)
and the threshold in τ . Table 4 collects these thresholds for two values of parameter
λ.21 For most countries, when λ = 0.45, the required savings rate is well above 1/4
18Results are available on request.
19An alternative approximation of λ can be obtained from the fact that Mincerian equation esti-
mates typically yield wage gains of an extra year of education of around 10%. It can easily be shown
that, in our model, this semi-elasticity is given by ∂(wtht)/(wtht)∂bt−1 = λ
1
bt−1
. If we consider data for
the cross section of countries used in estimation, years of education 25 years ago in 1975, 1980 and
1985 are, on average, 4.3, 4.8 and 5.4. If we normalize the cost of one year of education to one, this
yields λ values between 0.43 and 0.54, which are well within the range of estimated values.
20This is only calculated for countries that can be in either steady state.
21For λ = 0.55, the required savings rate would be higher and the required τ lower than in the
two cases presented in the table.
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Table 3: Calibrated φ¯ and φ¯ and observed φ (T=0.3).
φ¯ φ¯ φ
λ=0.35 λ=0.45 λ = 0.55
Brazil 0.2729 -0.3157 -1.3563 1.0807 0.075
Chile 0.3729 -0.1432 -1.0781 1.0940 0.25
Colombia -0.0192 -0.8545 -2.3578 0.017
Greece -1.6300 -4.0474 -8.9710 0.04
Italy -0.0641 -0.9170 -2.3986 0.045
Mexico 0.9335 0.8793 0.7825 0.077
Spain 0.1233 -0.6107 -1.9686 1.0911 0.08
of GDP. In the case of Greece, this ratio is 33% for λ = 0.45, which is almost twice
its average savings rate since 1970. Likewise, the implied τ threshold would require
a dramatic reduction of the public pensions outlays as a percentage of wage income
for most countries, especially for Greece, Italy, Spain, and Brazil.
Table 4: Threshold values of β, savings rate and τ to benefit from capital inflows
(T=0.3).
λ=0.35 λ=0.45
β s τ β s τ
Brazil 0.7120 0.1683 0.1545 0.6461 0.2221 0.0431
Chile 0.7161 0.2130 0.0513 0.6505 0.2704 0.0232
Colombia 0.6898 0.1940 0.1493 0.6219 0.2615 0.3286
Greece 0.6379 0.2754 0.0254 0.5666 0.3397 0.0112
Italy 0.6645 0.2403 0.0917 0.5947 0.2980 0.0444
Mexico 0.8827 0.0861 0.1435 0.8451 0.1144 0.0641
Spain 0.7112 0.2059 0.0815 0.6452 0.2573 0.0403
Finally, we calibrate the effects of capital inflows on economic growth. The ex-
ercise we consider is as follows. Taking the threshold φ¯ for which openness reduces
growth, we calculate the effect of a 150% increase in openness φ below and above the
threshold. That is, we consider the effects of capital inflows on growth in the uncon-
strained (positive) and constrained (negative) steady states around the φ¯ threshold.
For example, Brazil experienced a per capita growth rate of 3.02 per year before
liberalization. When φ rises from 0.18 to 0.27, in the unconstrained steady state,
Brazil’s growth rate increases to 3.08 per year. In the constrained steady state, when
φ increases from 0.27 to 0.41, growth falls from 3.02 to 2.84.
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Table 5 presents the results in terms of annualized growth rate changes. We show
the effects for the unconstrained steady state only for those four countries that can
fall in the unconstrained steady state. The effects on growth in the constrained steady
state are shown for all countries except Mexico, which is always unconstrained. The
quantitative effects of the liberalization policy in the unconstrained steady state are
small. The growth gains in the unconstrained steady state average 0.04% per year,
and are as small as 0.02% per year for Spain. These small gains are consistent with the
insignificant effects found in some empirical estimates. The negative growth effects
in the constrained steady state are slightly more sizeable although never very large.
The largest negative effect, corresponding to Chile, would imply a growth loss of 0.2%
per year. For the rest of the countries, however, the growth effect is less than -0.07%
per year on average.
Table 5: Growth (annualized) effects of a 150% increase in φ. λ = 0.35, T = 0.3.
Unconstrained Steady State
Initial φ Final φ Growth before Growth after
Brazil 0.1818 0.2728 3.0259 3.0834
Chile 0.2485 0.3728 4.9051 4.9614
Mexico 0.077 0.1155 3.6845 3.7108
Spain 0.0821 0.1232 2.2358 2.2573
Constrained Steady State
Initial φ Final φ Growth before Growth after
Brazil 0.273 0.4095 3.0259 2.8357
Chile 0.373 0.5595 4.9051 4.7036
Colombia 0.017 0.0255 3.4390 3.4331
Greece 0.040 0.060 2.3044 2.2898
Italy 0.045 0.0675 2.4114 2.4019
Spain 0.1234 0.1851 2.2358 2.2183
7 Conclusion
The effect of capital inflows on growth has met with empirically mixed results. How-
ever, the observation that current account surplus countries tend to grow faster than
current account deficit countries, has led to the development of a large literature
that analyzes the correlation between growth and capital flows for surplus economies
such as China, mostly in the context of exogenous growth models. This correla-
tion, however, also appears to hold for deficit countries. Successful capital account
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liberalizations also tend to be associated with higher savings rates.
In order to understand the relationship between growth and capital flows for deficit
countries, we develop an OLG model of endogenous growth and credit constraints for
economies whose autarky interest rate is above the world interest rate. Compati-
ble with existing evidence, capital inflows may either benefit or harm growth. The
model features endogenous growth through the accumulation of productive knowl-
edge (human capital). It also contains physical capital and a pay-as-you-go pensions
system that ensure a unique equilibrium. Importantly, since human capital is not
collateralizable, access to international credit markets is endogenously determined.
The model features a unique equilibrium, which can either be constrained or uncon-
strained. Then countries can converge to a constrained or an unconstrained steady
state.
In a constrained economy, because of default incentives, opening up to capital
inflows is bad for growth because it tightens credit constraints. Interest rates fall
and the return on savings falls giving agents less incentives to participate in asset
markets and hence more incentives to default on education investment loans. Thus,
they decrease savings and the accumulation of human capital having a negative effect
on growth. Results are reversed in an unconstrained economy in which capital inflows
become growth enhancing since agents can reach their optimal human capital level.
We study the effects of changes in some of the key parameters of the model to under-
stand the threshold nature of the capital flows-economic growth nexus. Focusing on
the effect of openness to FDI and equity inflows, we carry out a quantitative exercise
analyzing the likelihood of a set of economies falling in either steady state and the
required savings rate and public pensions size that would make these economies un-
constrained. We also analyze the growth effects of increased capital inflows and find
them to be quantitatively small.
Our results can be used to understand a body of recent empirical evidence find-
ing negative effects of capital flows on growth for poor and low savings economies.
Potential extensions of the model could consider the role of non-tradable sectors and
the real exchange rate. Since non-traded goods cannot be used to smooth consump-
tion intertemporally, changes in the real exchange rate can affect the endogenous
constraint and hence lead to a relationship between (persistent) real exchange rate
changes and growth.
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Appendices
A Equilibrium with a tax punishment on pension
income.
For calibration, we introduce a proportional tax on retirement pensions T > 0 as
an additional punishment. In case of default, agents are not only excluded from the
asset markets, but also taxed on their pension. In this case, the budget constraints
remain unchanged under commitment. However, without commitment they become
ct = wtht (1− τ)
dt+1 = pt+1 (1− T )
We then have that xmax (s∗ = 0) does not change, but x¯ now satisfies





= [wtht (1− τ)]
β [τ (1 + n)wtht (1− T )]
1−β
which yields, as before
x˜t = Min (x
∗, x¯t) =Min (λ (1− τ) , 1− τ − η (∆t+1)) .
With the presence of T in η
η (∆t+1) =
(






− τ (1 + n)∆t+1.



















∆¯ = [τ (1− T )]
1−β
β
(1− β) (1− τ)
(1 + n) β
(
1− α
(1− φ)α + τ (1− α)
) 1
β
We then obtain φ¯ as a solution to ∆¯ = ∆∗













(1− λ) (1− α)(
1− φ¯
)
α + βτ (1− α)
.
26
©2015. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Intuitively, a stronger punishment makes the country less likely to be constrained
(higher φ¯). The punishment does not affect the optimal level of education but gives
stronger incentives in favor of refunding and increases the amount the country can
borrow.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Lemma 1. Whatever the parameters configuration, the dynamics of the model can









With Ωi > 0, i = u, c, for u unconstrained and c constrained.
Proof. Considering equations (6) and (17) which give the definitions of debt
repayment x and the wage growth rate ∆, we obtain a first dynamic equation linking















The asset market equilibrium equation (29) gives a relationship between ∆ and xˆ:
∆t+1 = (1− τ − xˆt)Q (39)
Substituting ∆ from equation (39) into equation (38), we get:












Consider firstly the unconstrained case where xˆt = x



















Consider secondly the constrained case where xˆt = x¯ = 1 − τ − η(∆t+1). From
equation (39) we obtain
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We consider that 0 < φ < 1 and agents can borrow at the international interest


















W . And for a given initial condition k0, the economy will
converge monotonically to the steady state ˜˜ki.
C Proof of Proposition 3
From equation (26), the condition st > 0 can be rewritten as xt < x0(∆t+1) with:
x0(∆t+1) ≡ 1− τ −
β
1− β
τ(1 + n)∆t+1. (47)
Then, from equations (47) and (30), the equilibrium is always such as the condition
s > 0 holds.
Moreover, x∗ is constant and x¯ is convex, first decreasing and then increasing. As
x¯(0) = 1− τ and x∗ = λ(1− τ), then x∗ ≤ x¯(0).
Let us denote ∆0 the value of ∆ such that x
∗ corresponds to st = 0. If x¯(∆0) < x
∗,
then there exists a unique value ∆1 such that when ∆ < ∆1, x¯(∆) > x
∗, and when
∆ > ∆1, x¯(∆) < x
∗. This is illustrated by Figure 4.
From equation (47), x∗ = x0(∆) for ∆ = ∆0 with
∆0 =
(1− β)(1− τ)(1− λ)
βτ(1 + n)
,
and the value of x¯ corresponding to this ∆0:


















Figure 4: ∆0 and ∆1
Thus, x¯(∆0) < x


















which is true as (1− τ)β(1− λ)β < 1.
So we have proved that, for ∆ < ∆0, there is a unique intersection between x
∗
and x¯ as represented in figure 4. We now just need to determine ∆1. Let ∆¯ be the














(1− λ)(1− τ)(1− β)(1− α)
(1 + n) ((1− φ)α+ βτ(1− α))
. (49)
The equilibrium is constrained when ∆¯ is higher than ∆∗ which gives the condition
on φ.












(1− φ¯)α + βτ(1− α)
) . (50)
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(1− φ¯)α + τ(1− α)
+
β2(1− α)









(1− φ¯)α + τ(1− α)
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(1− φ¯)α+ τ(1 − α)
) (







(1− φ¯)α+ τ(1 − α)
) (












D Proof of Proposition 4
We consider, as in the Proposition, three different cases.
i) In the case where the economy is initially constrained, from Proposition 3 the
economy remains constrained when φ is increasing.





















From these two equations, we can eliminate k¯ and deduce an expression for e¯ depend-

















Since, from equation (48), we know that ∆¯ is increasing with φ and as the growth
rate is increasing with e¯, if we prove that e¯ is decreasing with ∆¯, this implies that the
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growth rate g is decreasing with φ. Thus, to show that increasing openness decreases
long term growth, we just have to show that Φ′(∆¯) > 0 for all ∆¯ in its definition set.
To be more precise, from Figure 2, it is clear that ∆¯ ∈ [∆min,∆max] where ∆min
is the value of ∆ such as x¯ = x∗ and ∆max is the value of ∆ such that x¯ = x0, x0
being the value of x making savings zero.






The value ∆min is characterized by:
η(∆min) = (1− λ)(1− τ). (60)
Proof:






τ(1 + n). (61)
From equation (47),
x0(∆) = 1− τ −
β
1− β
τ(1 + n)∆. (62)




τ(1 + n)∆ = 1− τ − ηβ. (63)















from which we can obtain the expression of ∆max.
The lower bound ∆min is the solution of the equation x¯(∆min) = x
∗(∆min) which
means that
λ(1− τ) = 1− τ − η(∆min)
and is equivalent to equation (61).
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Now that we have clearly identified the interval where ∆¯ belongs, we compute


































+ βτ(1 + n). (68)
Substituting in equation (66), Φ′(∆¯) < 0 iff
α
(
1− τ − η(∆¯
)
) + (1− α)
(




(1− β + αβ)η(∆¯)− (1− α)(1 + n)βτ∆¯− α(1− τ) > 0. (70)
Moreover, from equation (21), we know that










Thus Φ′(∆¯) < 0 iff Ψ(∆¯) > 0, with
Ψ(∆¯) ≡ (1− β(1− α))ζ∆¯1−β − (1 + n)τ∆¯ − α(1− τ). (72)
As ∆¯ belongs to the interval (∆min,∆max), we compute the value of the function
Ψ(∆¯) at the two extremes.
Ψ(∆min) = (1− τ) ((1− λ)(1− β(1− α))− α)− (1− α)(1 + n)βτ∆min, (73)





− α(1− τ) = 0. (74)
As
Ψ′(∆¯) = (1− β)(1− β(1− α))ζ∆¯−β − (1 + n)τ, (75)
and
Ψ′′(∆¯) = −β(1− β)(1− β(1− α))ζ∆¯−β1. (76)
Function Ψ′′(∆¯) is concave. Then if Ψ′(∆min) < 0, the slope of Ψ
′(∆¯) being always
decreasing on the interval (∆min,∆max), that means that Ψ
′(∆¯) is always negative






τ(1 + n), (77)
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then
Ψ′(∆min) = −β(1− α)(1 + n)τ < 0. (78)
We thus obtain that Ψ(∆¯) > 0 for any ∆¯ ∈ (∆min,∆max), meaning that Φ
′(∆¯) > 0
and thus that g is decreasing with φ.
ii) The economy is initially unconstrained and remains unconstrained with
openness. From Proposition 2, a rise in φ makes k∗ increasing. From equation








1−λ , and then e∗ increases with φ and so does g.
iii) From i), in an initially unconstrained economy, a rise in φ increases the growth
rate. When the economy becomes constrained, from ii), the growth rate decreases
with φ. From equations (6) and (17), when φ = φ¯, as x¯ = x∗ and ∆¯ = ∆∗, then
e¯ = e∗ and the growth rate is maximized.
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